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2021-06-30

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Housing Prices Are Going Up. Must They Crash?<blockquote>房价在上涨。他们一定要崩溃吗？</blockquote>

There are many reports of homebuyers getting into bidding wars and many cities where home prices hav

Housing Prices Are Going Up. Must They Crash?<blockquote>房价在上涨。他们一定要崩溃吗？</blockquote>

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{"i18n":{"language":"zh_CN"},"data":{"magic":2,"id":153866645,"tweetId":"153866645","gmtCreate":1625017657187,"gmtModify":1633945801056,"author":{"id":3573625719551490,"idStr":"3573625719551490","authorId":3573625719551490,"authorIdStr":"3573625719551490","name":"bane","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/cc8e3f417a294b78c7d27131c858156f","vip":1,"userType":1,"introduction":"","boolIsFan":false,"boolIsHead":false,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[],"fanSize":2,"starInvestorFlag":false},"themes":[],"images":[],"coverImages":[],"extraTitle":"","html":"<html><head></head><body>up up&nbsp;</body></html>","htmlText":"<html><head></head><body>up up&nbsp;</body></html>","text":"up up","highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":3,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"favoriteSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/153866645","repostId":1187567340,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1187567340","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1625017360,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1187567340?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-06-30 09:42","market":"us","language":"en","title":"Housing Prices Are Going Up. Must They Crash?<blockquote>房价在上涨。他们一定要崩溃吗？</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1187567340","media":"Barrons","summary":"There are many reports of homebuyers getting into bidding wars and many cities where home prices hav","content":"There are&nbsp;many&nbsp;reports&nbsp;of homebuyers getting into bidding wars and many cities where home prices have&nbsp;appreciated&nbsp;by well more than 10% over the past year. This naturally leads to a concern about market volatility: Must what goes up comedown? Are werepeatingthe excesses of the early 2000s, when housing prices surged before the market crashed?<blockquote>有许多报道称购房者陷入了竞购战，许多城市的房价在过去一年中上涨了10%以上。这自然会引发对市场波动的担忧：上涨的东西一定会下跌吗？我们是否正在经历21世纪初的过度行为，当时房价在市场崩溃之前飙升？</blockquote> Some&nbsp;analysts&nbsp;argue that this time, it’s even less likely that prices will fall.Inventoriesof new homes for sale are very low, and lending standards are much tighter than in 2005. This is true. In fact, the ground is even firmer than it seems.<blockquote>一些分析师认为，这一次，价格下跌的可能性更小。待售新房库存非常低，贷款标准也比2005年严格得多。这是真的。事实上，地面比看起来更坚固。</blockquote> New home inventories were very high before the Great Recession. Today, they are closer to the level that has been common for decades. The portion of&nbsp;inventory&nbsp;built and ready for move-in is especially low because of supply chain interruptions combined with a sudden boost of demand during the coronavirus pandemic. We shouldn’t worry much about a crash when buyers are eagerly snapping up the available homes.<blockquote>在大衰退之前，新房库存非常高。如今，它们更接近几十年来普遍存在的水平。由于供应链中断，加上冠状病毒大流行期间需求突然增加，已建成并准备入住的库存比例特别低。当买家急切地抢购可用房屋时，我们不应该太担心崩盘。</blockquote> Yet there’s another reason to believe a housing crash is unlikely: Even the high level of inventory in 2005 wasn’t nearly as speculative as most people think. Understanding why will help us interpret today’s market.<blockquote>然而，还有另一个理由相信房地产崩盘不太可能发生：即使是2005年的高库存水平也远不像大多数人想象的那样具有投机性。理解原因将有助于我们解读今天的市场。</blockquote> In&nbsp;2005, homes were being built because sales were high, and sales were high in parts of the country where demand was strong. Builders were conservatively scaling their inventories with rising sales. The same is true today.<blockquote>2005年，房屋正在建造，因为销量很高，而且在该国需求强劲的部分地区销量很高。随着销售额的增长，建筑商保守地扩大了库存。今天也是如此。</blockquote> Frequently, analysts&nbsp;cite&nbsp;the sharp rise in months of inventory—the number of months it will take to sell the current supply of homes being constructed for sale, at the current sales rate—as evidence of overzealous building during the last boom. But timing is key here. Decades of experience tell a clear story: Months of inventory is mostly a function of sales rather than builder speculation. When sales are strong, homes are turning over, and months of inventory tend to stay low. When sales quickly decline, builders tend to be left with unexpectedly high inventory.<blockquote>分析师经常引用库存月数的急剧上升——以当前的销售速度出售当前待售房屋供应所需的月数——作为上一次繁荣期间过度建筑的证据。但是时机是关键。几十年的经验告诉我们一个清晰的故事：几个月的库存主要是销售的函数，而不是建筑商的投机。当销售强劲时，房屋就会周转，几个月的库存往往会保持在较低水平。当销售迅速下降时，建筑商往往会留下出乎意料的高库存。</blockquote> From the late 1990s all the way up to the peak of new home sales in mid-2005,inventory&nbsp;was at historic lows, with about four months’ worth remaining. Of course, builders were creating more inventory to match growing sales, but it was barely enough to keep up with demand, so the number held fairly constant. Then, as economic growth started to slow, a deep drop in sales coincided with a sharp rise in months of inventory.<blockquote>从20世纪90年代末一直到2005年中期新房销售高峰，库存处于历史低点，还剩大约四个月的价值。当然，建筑商正在创造更多的库存来匹配不断增长的销售，但这几乎不足以满足需求，因此数量保持相当稳定。然后，随着经济增长开始放缓，销售额大幅下降的同时，几个月的库存急剧上升。</blockquote> Today, there are also about four months of inventory, and sales are around the same level as they were in the late 1990s. So, while it’s easy to look at on-the-ground activity and conclude that low inventory could cause bidding wars among buyers, we need to remember that buyers are really driving inventory more than the other way around. In other words, builders decide to create new homes when demand is high from buyers. If demand suddenly dries up, builders can’t suddenly make the inventory of homes under construction disappear.<blockquote>如今，也有大约四个月的库存，销售额与20世纪90年代末大致相同。因此，虽然很容易从实地活动中得出结论，低库存可能会导致买家之间的竞购战，但我们需要记住，买家实际上更多地推动了库存，而不是相反。换句话说，当买家需求高时，建筑商决定建造新房。如果需求突然枯竭，建筑商不可能突然让在建房屋库存消失。</blockquote> Demand for new homes is something over which federal policy&nbsp;makers actually have some control. The Federal Reserve and other federal regulators should aim to avoid sharp declines in sales. The Fed can do this by raising or lowering interest rates, changing the money supply, and targeting changes in prices and nominal economic activity. Federal regulators can make sure that stable lending conditions are maintained, or not.One reasonthe Great Recession was so bad was that Federal Reserve officials and other federal regulators, generally responding to public sentiment, washed their hands of the horrendous collapse in sales and left homebuilders and sellers out to dry.<blockquote>对新房的需求实际上是联邦政策制定者可以控制的。美联储和其他联邦监管机构的目标应该是避免销售额急剧下降。美联储可以通过提高或降低利率、改变货币供应量以及针对价格和名义经济活动的变化来做到这一点。联邦监管机构可以确保维持稳定的贷款条件，也可以不维持。大衰退如此严重的原因之一是，美联储官员和其他联邦监管机构通常会对公众情绪做出反应，对销售的可怕崩溃置之不理，让房屋建筑商和卖家束手无策。</blockquote> But even in that worst-case scenario, the 2000s market was much more resilient than it seemed. In July 2005, when buyers backed off and months of inventory started to surge, the median U.S. home price was $198,000, according toZillow. In July 2008, when months of inventory was near its peak, it was still at $199,000.<blockquote>但即使在最坏的情况下，2000年代的市场也比看起来要有弹性得多。根据Zillow的数据，2005年7月，当买家退出、数月库存开始激增时，美国房价中位数为198,000美元。2008年7月，当数月库存接近峰值时，仍为19.9万美元。</blockquote> At the&nbsp;June 2006&nbsp;Federal Reserve meeting, Ben Bernanke said, “It is a good thing that housing is cooling. If we could wave a magic wand and reinstate 2005, we wouldn’t want to do that.” It’s notable that Jerome Powell, who today holds Bernanke’s former position as Fed chair, isn’t openly pining for a “cooler” housing market.<blockquote>在2006年6月的美联储会议上，本·伯南克说：“住房正在降温是一件好事。如果我们能挥动魔杖，恢复2005年，我们就不会想这么做了。”值得注意的是，如今接替伯南克担任美联储主席的杰罗姆·鲍威尔并没有公开渴望房地产市场“降温”。</blockquote> There is a common belief that before the Great Recession, homebuyers were taken in by themyththat home prices never go down, and they became complacent. Those buyers turned out to be wrong. Yet, even when a concerted effort to kill housing markets succeeded, we had to beat them into submission for three full years before prices relented. Home prices can go down, but we have to work very hard, together, for a long time, to make them fall.<blockquote>人们普遍认为，在大衰退之前，购房者被房价永远不会下跌的神话所迷惑，他们变得自满。事实证明，那些买家错了。然而，即使扼杀房地产市场的共同努力取得了成功，我们也必须在价格回落之前整整三年的时间里击败他们。房价可以下跌，但我们必须非常努力，一起，在很长一段时间内，让它们下跌。</blockquote> If you are a buyer in a hot market where home prices are 30% higher than they were a year ago, you’re getting a 30% worse deal than you could have had back then. Nothing can be done about that. That said, the main things to be concerned with are the factors federal policymakers are in control of. There is little reason to expect housing demand to collapse. If it does, it will require communal intention—federal monetary and credit policies meant to create or accept a sharp drop in demand. And even if federal officials intend for housing construction to collapse, history suggests that a market contraction would push new sales down deeply for an extended period of time before prices relent.<blockquote>如果你是一个房价比一年前高出30%的热门市场的买家，那么你得到的交易比当时糟糕30%。对此无能为力。也就是说，主要需要关注的是联邦政策制定者控制的因素。几乎没有理由预计住房需求会崩溃。如果是这样，它将需要公共意图——旨在创造或接受需求急剧下降的联邦货币和信贷政策。即使联邦官员打算让住房建设崩溃，历史表明，在价格回落之前，市场收缩也会在很长一段时间内导致新销售大幅下降。</blockquote>","source":"lsy1601382232898","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Housing Prices Are Going Up. 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Must They Crash?<blockquote>房价在上涨。他们一定要崩溃吗？</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nBarrons2021-06-30 09:42\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\nThere are&nbsp;many&nbsp;reports&nbsp;of homebuyers getting into bidding wars and many cities where home prices have&nbsp;appreciated&nbsp;by well more than 10% over the past year. This naturally leads to a concern about market volatility: Must what goes up comedown? Are werepeatingthe excesses of the early 2000s, when housing prices surged before the market crashed?<blockquote>有许多报道称购房者陷入了竞购战，许多城市的房价在过去一年中上涨了10%以上。这自然会引发对市场波动的担忧：上涨的东西一定会下跌吗？我们是否正在经历21世纪初的过度行为，当时房价在市场崩溃之前飙升？</blockquote> Some&nbsp;analysts&nbsp;argue that this time, it’s even less likely that prices will fall.Inventoriesof new homes for sale are very low, and lending standards are much tighter than in 2005. This is true. In fact, the ground is even firmer than it seems.<blockquote>一些分析师认为，这一次，价格下跌的可能性更小。待售新房库存非常低，贷款标准也比2005年严格得多。这是真的。事实上，地面比看起来更坚固。</blockquote> New home inventories were very high before the Great Recession. Today, they are closer to the level that has been common for decades. The portion of&nbsp;inventory&nbsp;built and ready for move-in is especially low because of supply chain interruptions combined with a sudden boost of demand during the coronavirus pandemic. We shouldn’t worry much about a crash when buyers are eagerly snapping up the available homes.<blockquote>在大衰退之前，新房库存非常高。如今，它们更接近几十年来普遍存在的水平。由于供应链中断，加上冠状病毒大流行期间需求突然增加，已建成并准备入住的库存比例特别低。当买家急切地抢购可用房屋时，我们不应该太担心崩盘。</blockquote> Yet there’s another reason to believe a housing crash is unlikely: Even the high level of inventory in 2005 wasn’t nearly as speculative as most people think. Understanding why will help us interpret today’s market.<blockquote>然而，还有另一个理由相信房地产崩盘不太可能发生：即使是2005年的高库存水平也远不像大多数人想象的那样具有投机性。理解原因将有助于我们解读今天的市场。</blockquote> In&nbsp;2005, homes were being built because sales were high, and sales were high in parts of the country where demand was strong. Builders were conservatively scaling their inventories with rising sales. The same is true today.<blockquote>2005年，房屋正在建造，因为销量很高，而且在该国需求强劲的部分地区销量很高。随着销售额的增长，建筑商保守地扩大了库存。今天也是如此。</blockquote> Frequently, analysts&nbsp;cite&nbsp;the sharp rise in months of inventory—the number of months it will take to sell the current supply of homes being constructed for sale, at the current sales rate—as evidence of overzealous building during the last boom. But timing is key here. Decades of experience tell a clear story: Months of inventory is mostly a function of sales rather than builder speculation. When sales are strong, homes are turning over, and months of inventory tend to stay low. When sales quickly decline, builders tend to be left with unexpectedly high inventory.<blockquote>分析师经常引用库存月数的急剧上升——以当前的销售速度出售当前待售房屋供应所需的月数——作为上一次繁荣期间过度建筑的证据。但是时机是关键。几十年的经验告诉我们一个清晰的故事：几个月的库存主要是销售的函数，而不是建筑商的投机。当销售强劲时，房屋就会周转，几个月的库存往往会保持在较低水平。当销售迅速下降时，建筑商往往会留下出乎意料的高库存。</blockquote> From the late 1990s all the way up to the peak of new home sales in mid-2005,inventory&nbsp;was at historic lows, with about four months’ worth remaining. Of course, builders were creating more inventory to match growing sales, but it was barely enough to keep up with demand, so the number held fairly constant. Then, as economic growth started to slow, a deep drop in sales coincided with a sharp rise in months of inventory.<blockquote>从20世纪90年代末一直到2005年中期新房销售高峰，库存处于历史低点，还剩大约四个月的价值。当然，建筑商正在创造更多的库存来匹配不断增长的销售，但这几乎不足以满足需求，因此数量保持相当稳定。然后，随着经济增长开始放缓，销售额大幅下降的同时，几个月的库存急剧上升。</blockquote> Today, there are also about four months of inventory, and sales are around the same level as they were in the late 1990s. So, while it’s easy to look at on-the-ground activity and conclude that low inventory could cause bidding wars among buyers, we need to remember that buyers are really driving inventory more than the other way around. In other words, builders decide to create new homes when demand is high from buyers. If demand suddenly dries up, builders can’t suddenly make the inventory of homes under construction disappear.<blockquote>如今，也有大约四个月的库存，销售额与20世纪90年代末大致相同。因此，虽然很容易从实地活动中得出结论，低库存可能会导致买家之间的竞购战，但我们需要记住，买家实际上更多地推动了库存，而不是相反。换句话说，当买家需求高时，建筑商决定建造新房。如果需求突然枯竭，建筑商不可能突然让在建房屋库存消失。</blockquote> Demand for new homes is something over which federal policy&nbsp;makers actually have some control. The Federal Reserve and other federal regulators should aim to avoid sharp declines in sales. The Fed can do this by raising or lowering interest rates, changing the money supply, and targeting changes in prices and nominal economic activity. Federal regulators can make sure that stable lending conditions are maintained, or not.One reasonthe Great Recession was so bad was that Federal Reserve officials and other federal regulators, generally responding to public sentiment, washed their hands of the horrendous collapse in sales and left homebuilders and sellers out to dry.<blockquote>对新房的需求实际上是联邦政策制定者可以控制的。美联储和其他联邦监管机构的目标应该是避免销售额急剧下降。美联储可以通过提高或降低利率、改变货币供应量以及针对价格和名义经济活动的变化来做到这一点。联邦监管机构可以确保维持稳定的贷款条件，也可以不维持。大衰退如此严重的原因之一是，美联储官员和其他联邦监管机构通常会对公众情绪做出反应，对销售的可怕崩溃置之不理，让房屋建筑商和卖家束手无策。</blockquote> But even in that worst-case scenario, the 2000s market was much more resilient than it seemed. In July 2005, when buyers backed off and months of inventory started to surge, the median U.S. home price was $198,000, according toZillow. In July 2008, when months of inventory was near its peak, it was still at $199,000.<blockquote>但即使在最坏的情况下，2000年代的市场也比看起来要有弹性得多。根据Zillow的数据，2005年7月，当买家退出、数月库存开始激增时，美国房价中位数为198,000美元。2008年7月，当数月库存接近峰值时，仍为19.9万美元。</blockquote> At the&nbsp;June 2006&nbsp;Federal Reserve meeting, Ben Bernanke said, “It is a good thing that housing is cooling. If we could wave a magic wand and reinstate 2005, we wouldn’t want to do that.” It’s notable that Jerome Powell, who today holds Bernanke’s former position as Fed chair, isn’t openly pining for a “cooler” housing market.<blockquote>在2006年6月的美联储会议上，本·伯南克说：“住房正在降温是一件好事。如果我们能挥动魔杖，恢复2005年，我们就不会想这么做了。”值得注意的是，如今接替伯南克担任美联储主席的杰罗姆·鲍威尔并没有公开渴望房地产市场“降温”。</blockquote> There is a common belief that before the Great Recession, homebuyers were taken in by themyththat home prices never go down, and they became complacent. Those buyers turned out to be wrong. Yet, even when a concerted effort to kill housing markets succeeded, we had to beat them into submission for three full years before prices relented. Home prices can go down, but we have to work very hard, together, for a long time, to make them fall.<blockquote>人们普遍认为，在大衰退之前，购房者被房价永远不会下跌的神话所迷惑，他们变得自满。事实证明，那些买家错了。然而，即使扼杀房地产市场的共同努力取得了成功，我们也必须在价格回落之前整整三年的时间里击败他们。房价可以下跌，但我们必须非常努力，一起，在很长一段时间内，让它们下跌。</blockquote> If you are a buyer in a hot market where home prices are 30% higher than they were a year ago, you’re getting a 30% worse deal than you could have had back then. Nothing can be done about that. That said, the main things to be concerned with are the factors federal policymakers are in control of. There is little reason to expect housing demand to collapse. If it does, it will require communal intention—federal monetary and credit policies meant to create or accept a sharp drop in demand. And even if federal officials intend for housing construction to collapse, history suggests that a market contraction would push new sales down deeply for an extended period of time before prices relent.<blockquote>如果你是一个房价比一年前高出30%的热门市场的买家，那么你得到的交易比当时糟糕30%。对此无能为力。也就是说，主要需要关注的是联邦政策制定者控制的因素。几乎没有理由预计住房需求会崩溃。如果是这样，它将需要公共意图——旨在创造或接受需求急剧下降的联邦货币和信贷政策。即使联邦官员打算让住房建设崩溃，历史表明，在价格回落之前，市场收缩也会在很长一段时间内导致新销售大幅下降。</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.barrons.com/articles/housing-prices-market-crash-51624912461?siteid=yhoof2\">Barrons</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".SPX":"S&P 500 Index"},"source_url":"https://www.barrons.com/articles/housing-prices-market-crash-51624912461?siteid=yhoof2","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1187567340","content_text":"There are many reports of homebuyers getting into bidding wars and many cities where home prices have appreciated by well more than 10% over the past year. This naturally leads to a concern about market volatility: Must what goes up comedown? Are werepeatingthe excesses of the early 2000s, when housing prices surged before the market crashed?\nSome analysts argue that this time, it’s even less likely that prices will fall.Inventoriesof new homes for sale are very low, and lending standards are much tighter than in 2005. This is true. In fact, the ground is even firmer than it seems.\nNew home inventories were very high before the Great Recession. Today, they are closer to the level that has been common for decades. The portion of inventory built and ready for move-in is especially low because of supply chain interruptions combined with a sudden boost of demand during the coronavirus pandemic. We shouldn’t worry much about a crash when buyers are eagerly snapping up the available homes.\nYet there’s another reason to believe a housing crash is unlikely: Even the high level of inventory in 2005 wasn’t nearly as speculative as most people think. Understanding why will help us interpret today’s market.\nIn 2005, homes were being built because sales were high, and sales were high in parts of the country where demand was strong. Builders were conservatively scaling their inventories with rising sales. The same is true today.\nFrequently, analysts cite the sharp rise in months of inventory—the number of months it will take to sell the current supply of homes being constructed for sale, at the current sales rate—as evidence of overzealous building during the last boom. But timing is key here. Decades of experience tell a clear story: Months of inventory is mostly a function of sales rather than builder speculation. When sales are strong, homes are turning over, and months of inventory tend to stay low. When sales quickly decline, builders tend to be left with unexpectedly high inventory.\nFrom the late 1990s all the way up to the peak of new home sales in mid-2005,inventory was at historic lows, with about four months’ worth remaining. Of course, builders were creating more inventory to match growing sales, but it was barely enough to keep up with demand, so the number held fairly constant. Then, as economic growth started to slow, a deep drop in sales coincided with a sharp rise in months of inventory.\nToday, there are also about four months of inventory, and sales are around the same level as they were in the late 1990s. So, while it’s easy to look at on-the-ground activity and conclude that low inventory could cause bidding wars among buyers, we need to remember that buyers are really driving inventory more than the other way around. In other words, builders decide to create new homes when demand is high from buyers. If demand suddenly dries up, builders can’t suddenly make the inventory of homes under construction disappear.\nDemand for new homes is something over which federal policy makers actually have some control. The Federal Reserve and other federal regulators should aim to avoid sharp declines in sales. The Fed can do this by raising or lowering interest rates, changing the money supply, and targeting changes in prices and nominal economic activity. Federal regulators can make sure that stable lending conditions are maintained, or not.One reasonthe Great Recession was so bad was that Federal Reserve officials and other federal regulators, generally responding to public sentiment, washed their hands of the horrendous collapse in sales and left homebuilders and sellers out to dry.\nBut even in that worst-case scenario, the 2000s market was much more resilient than it seemed. In July 2005, when buyers backed off and months of inventory started to surge, the median U.S. home price was $198,000, according toZillow. In July 2008, when months of inventory was near its peak, it was still at $199,000.\nAt the June 2006 Federal Reserve meeting, Ben Bernanke said, “It is a good thing that housing is cooling. If we could wave a magic wand and reinstate 2005, we wouldn’t want to do that.” It’s notable that Jerome Powell, who today holds Bernanke’s former position as Fed chair, isn’t openly pining for a “cooler” housing market.\nThere is a common belief that before the Great Recession, homebuyers were taken in by themyththat home prices never go down, and they became complacent. Those buyers turned out to be wrong. Yet, even when a concerted effort to kill housing markets succeeded, we had to beat them into submission for three full years before prices relented. Home prices can go down, but we have to work very hard, together, for a long time, to make them fall.\nIf you are a buyer in a hot market where home prices are 30% higher than they were a year ago, you’re getting a 30% worse deal than you could have had back then. Nothing can be done about that. That said, the main things to be concerned with are the factors federal policymakers are in control of. There is little reason to expect housing demand to collapse. If it does, it will require communal intention—federal monetary and credit policies meant to create or accept a sharp drop in demand. And even if federal officials intend for housing construction to collapse, history suggests that a market contraction would push new sales down deeply for an extended period of time before prices relent.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1837,"commentLimit":10,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"symbols":[],"verified":2,"subType":0,"readableState":1,"langContent":"EN","currentLanguage":"EN","warmUpFlag":false,"orderFlag":false,"shareable":true,"causeOfNotShareable":"","featuresForAnalytics":[],"commentAndTweetFlag":false,"andRepostAutoSelectedFlag":false,"upFlag":false,"length":4,"xxTargetLangEnum":"ORIG"},"commentList":[],"hasMoreComment":false,"orderType":2}