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2021-04-14

Monetary Policy Blunder: Not Managing Economic & Financial Outcomes Equally<blockquote>货币政策失误：没有平等管理经济和金融结果</blockquote>

Actual economic outcomes and not forecasted onesare the new policy of the Federal Reserve. Yet, this

Monetary Policy Blunder: Not Managing Economic & Financial Outcomes Equally<blockquote>货币政策失误：没有平等管理经济和金融结果</blockquote>

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{"i18n":{"language":"zh_CN"},"data":{"magic":2,"id":345440743,"tweetId":"345440743","gmtCreate":1618336376182,"gmtModify":1634293630820,"author":{"id":3561867231268060,"idStr":"3561867231268060","authorId":3561867231268060,"authorIdStr":"3561867231268060","name":"Vianaiviv","avatar":"https://static.laohu8.com/default-avatar.jpg","vip":1,"userType":1,"introduction":"","boolIsFan":false,"boolIsHead":false,"crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"individualDisplayBadges":[],"fanSize":3,"starInvestorFlag":false},"themes":[],"images":[],"coverImages":[],"extraTitle":"","html":"<html><head></head><body>Oo</body></html>","htmlText":"<html><head></head><body>Oo</body></html>","text":"Oo","highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":2,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"favoriteSize":0,"link":"https://laohu8.com/post/345440743","repostId":1112150823,"repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"1112150823","kind":"news","pubTimestamp":1618329402,"share":"https://www.laohu8.com/m/news/1112150823?lang=zh_CN&edition=full","pubTime":"2021-04-13 23:56","market":"us","language":"en","title":"Monetary Policy Blunder: Not Managing Economic & Financial Outcomes Equally<blockquote>货币政策失误：没有平等管理经济和金融结果</blockquote>","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1112150823","media":"zerohedge","summary":"Actual economic outcomes and not forecasted onesare the new policy of the Federal Reserve. Yet, this","content":"Actual economic outcomes and not forecasted onesare the new policy of the Federal Reserve. Yet, this strategy's flaw is that it islimited to economic outcomes and overlooks or ignores financial ones.It is not a coincidence that the last two recessions resulted from asset price imbalances rather than too much general inflation.<blockquote>实际经济结果和非预测结果是美联储的新政策。然而，这种策略的缺陷在于局限于经济结果，而忽略或忽略金融结果。过去两次衰退是由资产价格失衡而不是过度的普遍通胀造成的，这并非巧合。</blockquote> Failure to look at asset market outcomes &amp; excesses as an equal cause of adverse outcomes only increases the odds it will reoccur.<blockquote>未能将资产市场结果和过度行为视为不利结果的同等原因，只会增加其再次发生的可能性。</blockquote> In a recent interview at Barron's, Ms. Mary Daly, President of the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank, was asked about the red-hot housing market and whether the Fed should adjust its buying mortgage securities fueling home-buying. Ms. Daly said, \"People getting into housing because interest rates are lower and they can afford a mortgage is a positive development...One of the transmission mechanisms we have is to lower the interest rate. ....It has worked well. ....I see this as a Federal Reserve win. Our monetary policy transmission mechanism is working.\"<blockquote>旧金山联邦储备银行行长玛丽·戴利女士最近在接受《巴伦周刊》采访时被问及火热的房地产市场以及美联储是否应该调整购买抵押贷款证券以刺激购房。Daly女士说，“人们因为利率较低并且能够负担得起抵押贷款而进入住房，这是一个积极的发展……我们拥有的传导机制之一就是降低利率。……效果很好。……我认为这是美联储的胜利。我们的货币政策传导机制正在发挥作用。”</blockquote> The house price index published by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) is up 12% in the last twelve months. During the 2000s housing bubble, the fastest one-year increase in housing prices occurred in 2005 when prices rose 10.4%. The current house price surge is 160 basis points above the bubble surge, and the residential real estate market value is also one-third higher than the peak of the housing bubble.<blockquote>联邦住房金融局(FHFA)公布的房价指数在过去12个月中上涨了12%。在2000年代的房地产泡沫期间，房价一年涨幅最快的是2005年，当时房价上涨了10.4%。目前的房价暴涨比泡沫暴涨高出160个基点，住宅地产市值也比房产泡沫峰值高出三分之一。</blockquote> Yet, Ms. Daly sees no adverse risks in providing more monetary fuel to housing as her priorities are \"to make sure that every American who wants a job has one, and inflation gets back to the average 2% inflation target.\"The Fed dismissed the red-hot housing market's dangers in the 2000s, only to confront the financial system's near-collapse when house prices fell hard. That proved to be a significant policy error, and the risk of another one is growing with each passing day.<blockquote>然而，戴利女士认为为住房提供更多货币燃料不会带来不利风险，因为她的首要任务是“确保每个想要工作的美国人都有一份工作，并且通胀回到2%的平均通胀目标。”美联储对2000年代炙手可热的房地产市场的危险不屑一顾，却在房价大幅下跌时面临金融体系近乎崩溃的局面。事实证明，这是一个重大的政策错误，而且另一个错误的风险与日俱增。</blockquote> With equity markets at record levels, policymakers at least acknowledge elevated levels. Still, they are reluctant to act to dampen investor enthusiasm and speculation. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Robert Kaplan recently commented, \"There's no question that financial assets, broadly, are at elevated valuation levels.\" He was concerned \"about excess risking and if excess risk-taking goes too far, whether it creates excesses or imbalances, that could ultimately create challenges..\" Yet, Mr. Kaplan said he was willing to wait until 2022 to raise official rates, and even then by only 25 basis points.<blockquote>随着股市处于创纪录水平，政策制定者至少承认股市水平有所上升。尽管如此，他们还是不愿意采取行动来抑制投资者的热情和投机。达拉斯联邦储备银行行长罗伯特·卡普兰最近评论道，“毫无疑问，金融资产总体上处于较高的估值水平。”他担心“过度冒险，如果过度冒险走得太远，无论是造成过度还是失衡，最终都可能带来挑战。”然而，卡普兰表示，他愿意等到2022年才加息，即使到那时也只加息25个基点。</blockquote> Painting by the numbers: domestic equities' market value has increased 50% or $16 trillion to $48.7 trillion in the past two years.At the end of 2020, the equities' domestic market valuation was 2.3X times Nominal GDP, a new record high and 50 basis points (or $10 trillion) higher than the prior record during the tech bubble peak in 2000.Finance and the economy are more interconnected nowadays than in 2000, so a sharp pullback in equity values would have a more significant adverse impact.<blockquote>数字描绘：过去两年，国内股票市值增长了50%，即16万亿美元，达到48.7万亿美元。截至2020年底，国内股市估值是名义GDP的2.3倍，创下历史新高，比2000年科技泡沫高峰期间的纪录高出50个基点（或10万亿美元）。如今，金融和经济的联系比2000年更加紧密，因此股票价值的大幅回调将产生更大的不利影响。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/282d05e1348f989bb00f6fb5d16e91c6\" tg-width=\"500\" tg-height=\"296\">Not all asset price bubbles are alike. But after experiencing two in the past 20 years, the characteristics of bubbles are known.During the tech and housing bubbles, the Federal Reserve view was to ignore the elevated asset prices. That's because most thought if a speculative asset bubble burst, policymakers could quickly bring down official rates to alleviate the broader economy's damage. In hindsight, that proved to be poor judgment since both the tech and housing bubbles triggered an economic recession, with a near-collapse in the financial system following the housing bust.<blockquote>并非所有资产价格泡沫都是一样的。但在过去20年经历了两次之后，泡沫的特征就知道了。在科技和房地产泡沫期间，美联储的观点是忽视资产价格的上涨。这是因为大多数人认为，如果投机性资产泡沫破裂，政策制定者可以迅速降低官方利率，以减轻更广泛经济的损害。事后看来，这被证明是一个糟糕的判断，因为科技和房地产泡沫都引发了经济衰退，房地产泡沫后金融体系几近崩溃。</blockquote> The Fed's easy-money policy has put a lot of wind at the backs of the asset markets.It's striking to see the Fed's willingness to maintain the scale of monetary accommodation, especially given their poor record with asset bubbles.Monetary policy (i.e., official rates) may be too blunt of a tool for practical use to deflate bubbles, but that does not mean a policy of low rates can't create them.<blockquote>美联储的宽松货币政策给资产市场带来了很大的压力。看到美联储维持货币宽松规模的意愿令人震惊，特别是考虑到他们在资产泡沫方面的不良记录。货币政策（即官方利率）可能过于生硬，无法实际用于消除泡沫，但这并不意味着低利率政策不能制造泡沫。</blockquote>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Monetary Policy Blunder: Not Managing Economic & Financial Outcomes Equally<blockquote>货币政策失误：没有平等管理经济和金融结果</blockquote></title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nMonetary Policy Blunder: Not Managing Economic & Financial Outcomes Equally<blockquote>货币政策失误：没有平等管理经济和金融结果</blockquote>\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n\nzerohedge2021-04-13 23:56\n\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\nActual economic outcomes and not forecasted onesare the new policy of the Federal Reserve. Yet, this strategy's flaw is that it islimited to economic outcomes and overlooks or ignores financial ones.It is not a coincidence that the last two recessions resulted from asset price imbalances rather than too much general inflation.<blockquote>实际经济结果和非预测结果是美联储的新政策。然而，这种策略的缺陷在于局限于经济结果，而忽略或忽略金融结果。过去两次衰退是由资产价格失衡而不是过度的普遍通胀造成的，这并非巧合。</blockquote> Failure to look at asset market outcomes &amp; excesses as an equal cause of adverse outcomes only increases the odds it will reoccur.<blockquote>未能将资产市场结果和过度行为视为不利结果的同等原因，只会增加其再次发生的可能性。</blockquote> In a recent interview at Barron's, Ms. Mary Daly, President of the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank, was asked about the red-hot housing market and whether the Fed should adjust its buying mortgage securities fueling home-buying. Ms. Daly said, \"People getting into housing because interest rates are lower and they can afford a mortgage is a positive development...One of the transmission mechanisms we have is to lower the interest rate. ....It has worked well. ....I see this as a Federal Reserve win. Our monetary policy transmission mechanism is working.\"<blockquote>旧金山联邦储备银行行长玛丽·戴利女士最近在接受《巴伦周刊》采访时被问及火热的房地产市场以及美联储是否应该调整购买抵押贷款证券以刺激购房。Daly女士说，“人们因为利率较低并且能够负担得起抵押贷款而进入住房，这是一个积极的发展……我们拥有的传导机制之一就是降低利率。……效果很好。……我认为这是美联储的胜利。我们的货币政策传导机制正在发挥作用。”</blockquote> The house price index published by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) is up 12% in the last twelve months. During the 2000s housing bubble, the fastest one-year increase in housing prices occurred in 2005 when prices rose 10.4%. The current house price surge is 160 basis points above the bubble surge, and the residential real estate market value is also one-third higher than the peak of the housing bubble.<blockquote>联邦住房金融局(FHFA)公布的房价指数在过去12个月中上涨了12%。在2000年代的房地产泡沫期间，房价一年涨幅最快的是2005年，当时房价上涨了10.4%。目前的房价暴涨比泡沫暴涨高出160个基点，住宅地产市值也比房产泡沫峰值高出三分之一。</blockquote> Yet, Ms. Daly sees no adverse risks in providing more monetary fuel to housing as her priorities are \"to make sure that every American who wants a job has one, and inflation gets back to the average 2% inflation target.\"The Fed dismissed the red-hot housing market's dangers in the 2000s, only to confront the financial system's near-collapse when house prices fell hard. That proved to be a significant policy error, and the risk of another one is growing with each passing day.<blockquote>然而，戴利女士认为为住房提供更多货币燃料不会带来不利风险，因为她的首要任务是“确保每个想要工作的美国人都有一份工作，并且通胀回到2%的平均通胀目标。”美联储对2000年代炙手可热的房地产市场的危险不屑一顾，却在房价大幅下跌时面临金融体系近乎崩溃的局面。事实证明，这是一个重大的政策错误，而且另一个错误的风险与日俱增。</blockquote> With equity markets at record levels, policymakers at least acknowledge elevated levels. Still, they are reluctant to act to dampen investor enthusiasm and speculation. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Robert Kaplan recently commented, \"There's no question that financial assets, broadly, are at elevated valuation levels.\" He was concerned \"about excess risking and if excess risk-taking goes too far, whether it creates excesses or imbalances, that could ultimately create challenges..\" Yet, Mr. Kaplan said he was willing to wait until 2022 to raise official rates, and even then by only 25 basis points.<blockquote>随着股市处于创纪录水平，政策制定者至少承认股市水平有所上升。尽管如此，他们还是不愿意采取行动来抑制投资者的热情和投机。达拉斯联邦储备银行行长罗伯特·卡普兰最近评论道，“毫无疑问，金融资产总体上处于较高的估值水平。”他担心“过度冒险，如果过度冒险走得太远，无论是造成过度还是失衡，最终都可能带来挑战。”然而，卡普兰表示，他愿意等到2022年才加息，即使到那时也只加息25个基点。</blockquote> Painting by the numbers: domestic equities' market value has increased 50% or $16 trillion to $48.7 trillion in the past two years.At the end of 2020, the equities' domestic market valuation was 2.3X times Nominal GDP, a new record high and 50 basis points (or $10 trillion) higher than the prior record during the tech bubble peak in 2000.Finance and the economy are more interconnected nowadays than in 2000, so a sharp pullback in equity values would have a more significant adverse impact.<blockquote>数字描绘：过去两年，国内股票市值增长了50%，即16万亿美元，达到48.7万亿美元。截至2020年底，国内股市估值是名义GDP的2.3倍，创下历史新高，比2000年科技泡沫高峰期间的纪录高出50个基点（或10万亿美元）。如今，金融和经济的联系比2000年更加紧密，因此股票价值的大幅回调将产生更大的不利影响。</blockquote> <img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/282d05e1348f989bb00f6fb5d16e91c6\" tg-width=\"500\" tg-height=\"296\">Not all asset price bubbles are alike. But after experiencing two in the past 20 years, the characteristics of bubbles are known.During the tech and housing bubbles, the Federal Reserve view was to ignore the elevated asset prices. That's because most thought if a speculative asset bubble burst, policymakers could quickly bring down official rates to alleviate the broader economy's damage. In hindsight, that proved to be poor judgment since both the tech and housing bubbles triggered an economic recession, with a near-collapse in the financial system following the housing bust.<blockquote>并非所有资产价格泡沫都是一样的。但在过去20年经历了两次之后，泡沫的特征就知道了。在科技和房地产泡沫期间，美联储的观点是忽视资产价格的上涨。这是因为大多数人认为，如果投机性资产泡沫破裂，政策制定者可以迅速降低官方利率，以减轻更广泛经济的损害。事后看来，这被证明是一个糟糕的判断，因为科技和房地产泡沫都引发了经济衰退，房地产泡沫后金融体系几近崩溃。</blockquote> The Fed's easy-money policy has put a lot of wind at the backs of the asset markets.It's striking to see the Fed's willingness to maintain the scale of monetary accommodation, especially given their poor record with asset bubbles.Monetary policy (i.e., official rates) may be too blunt of a tool for practical use to deflate bubbles, but that does not mean a policy of low rates can't create them.<blockquote>美联储的宽松货币政策给资产市场带来了很大的压力。看到美联储维持货币宽松规模的意愿令人震惊，特别是考虑到他们在资产泡沫方面的不良记录。货币政策（即官方利率）可能过于生硬，无法实际用于消除泡沫，但这并不意味着低利率政策不能制造泡沫。</blockquote>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n 来源：<a href=\"https://www.zerohedge.com/economics/monetary-policy-blunder-not-managing-economic-financial-outcomes-equally?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29\">zerohedge</a>\n为提升您的阅读体验，我们对本页面进行了排版优化\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite","SPY":"标普500ETF"},"source_url":"https://www.zerohedge.com/economics/monetary-policy-blunder-not-managing-economic-financial-outcomes-equally?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+zerohedge%2Ffeed+%28zero+hedge+-+on+a+long+enough+timeline%2C+the+survival+rate+for+everyone+drops+to+zero%29","is_english":true,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1112150823","content_text":"Actual economic outcomes and not forecasted onesare the new policy of the Federal Reserve. Yet, this strategy's flaw is that it islimited to economic outcomes and overlooks or ignores financial ones.It is not a coincidence that the last two recessions resulted from asset price imbalances rather than too much general inflation.\nFailure to look at asset market outcomes & excesses as an equal cause of adverse outcomes only increases the odds it will reoccur.\nIn a recent interview at Barron's, Ms. Mary Daly, President of the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank, was asked about the red-hot housing market and whether the Fed should adjust its buying mortgage securities fueling home-buying. Ms. Daly said, \"People getting into housing because interest rates are lower and they can afford a mortgage is a positive development...One of the transmission mechanisms we have is to lower the interest rate. ....It has worked well. ....I see this as a Federal Reserve win. Our monetary policy transmission mechanism is working.\"\nThe house price index published by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) is up 12% in the last twelve months. During the 2000s housing bubble, the fastest one-year increase in housing prices occurred in 2005 when prices rose 10.4%. The current house price surge is 160 basis points above the bubble surge, and the residential real estate market value is also one-third higher than the peak of the housing bubble.\nYet, Ms. Daly sees no adverse risks in providing more monetary fuel to housing as her priorities are \"to make sure that every American who wants a job has one, and inflation gets back to the average 2% inflation target.\"The Fed dismissed the red-hot housing market's dangers in the 2000s, only to confront the financial system's near-collapse when house prices fell hard. That proved to be a significant policy error, and the risk of another one is growing with each passing day.\nWith equity markets at record levels, policymakers at least acknowledge elevated levels. Still, they are reluctant to act to dampen investor enthusiasm and speculation. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Robert Kaplan recently commented, \"There's no question that financial assets, broadly, are at elevated valuation levels.\" He was concerned \"about excess risking and if excess risk-taking goes too far, whether it creates excesses or imbalances, that could ultimately create challenges..\" Yet, Mr. Kaplan said he was willing to wait until 2022 to raise official rates, and even then by only 25 basis points.\nPainting by the numbers: domestic equities' market value has increased 50% or $16 trillion to $48.7 trillion in the past two years.At the end of 2020, the equities' domestic market valuation was 2.3X times Nominal GDP, a new record high and 50 basis points (or $10 trillion) higher than the prior record during the tech bubble peak in 2000.Finance and the economy are more interconnected nowadays than in 2000, so a sharp pullback in equity values would have a more significant adverse impact.\nNot all asset price bubbles are alike. But after experiencing two in the past 20 years, the characteristics of bubbles are known.During the tech and housing bubbles, the Federal Reserve view was to ignore the elevated asset prices. That's because most thought if a speculative asset bubble burst, policymakers could quickly bring down official rates to alleviate the broader economy's damage. In hindsight, that proved to be poor judgment since both the tech and housing bubbles triggered an economic recession, with a near-collapse in the financial system following the housing bust.\nThe Fed's easy-money policy has put a lot of wind at the backs of the asset markets.It's striking to see the Fed's willingness to maintain the scale of monetary accommodation, especially given their poor record with asset bubbles.Monetary policy (i.e., official rates) may be too blunt of a tool for practical use to deflate bubbles, but that does not mean a policy of low rates can't create them.","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".DJI":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".IXIC":0.9,".SPX":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":1942,"commentLimit":10,"likeStatus":false,"favoriteStatus":false,"reportStatus":false,"symbols":[],"verified":2,"subType":0,"readableState":1,"langContent":"EN","currentLanguage":"EN","warmUpFlag":false,"orderFlag":false,"shareable":true,"causeOfNotShareable":"","featuresForAnalytics":[],"commentAndTweetFlag":false,"andRepostAutoSelectedFlag":false,"upFlag":false,"length":2,"xxTargetLangEnum":"ORIG"},"commentList":[],"hasMoreComment":false,"orderType":2}